Book Review [133] :An Incredible War - IAF in Kashmir War 1947-48

An Incredible War - IAF in Kashmir War 1947-1948 by Air Marshal (retd) Bharat Kumar is a brilliantly researched book on the role of Indian Air Force in Kashmir war.

Jammu and Kashmir in October 1947 

Maharaja of Kashmir signed standstill agreement with Pakistan on 12^th August 1947 but no such agreement with India. Pakistan started pressurizing Kashmir by withholding supplies of Kerosene, gasoline, food, edible oils, salt etc.

Colonel Akbar Khan (later Major General) was put in charge of the operation of the invasion of Kashmir by tribesmen. The full scale invasion was launched along the Domel road. The Domel road links to Baramula and then to Srinagar.

On 24^th October, Radio Pakistan announced the formation of the provisional government of Kashmir with Sardar Mohammed Ibrahim as its head. The government was recognized by Pakistan. The broadcast also alleged that Maharaja had fled from Kashmir. Operation Gulmarg was the name given to the main invasion that was launched on 22^nd Oct 1947. The invading raiders consisted of tribesmen, members of Muslim League, ex-Indian National Army personnel, ex-Servicemen led by Pakistani Army personnel.

The main column of raiders drove down the Domel road and headed for Srinagar. These columns were held up at Uri by the brave action of the state forces under the command of Brigadier Rajinder Singh who died defending his state but the progress of raiders were slowed down. Rajinder Singh left with about 100 men and reached Uri on 22^nd Oct. First engagement took place on 23^rd Oct, enemy suffered heavy casualties but Rajinder Singh lost one of his platoons. He got the Uri Bridge blown up, this slowed the raiders down. He delayed the enemy at Mahura on Oct 25^th and gave a determined fight at Rampur Buniyar till 0100 hrs on 27^th Oct. He was hit in arm and leg but he continued to rally his men, unfortunately he was captured by raiders never to be seen again. He was the first Indian to be awarded MVC. By Oct 24 the raiders had over run Uri and reached Baramula. Baramula was pillaged, raped etc on 26^th Oct but this gave crucial time to Maharaja and Indian forces.

The information of the launch of the Raider's offensive was conveyed by the C-in-C of Pakistan Army Major General Douglas Gracey to General Sir Rob Lockhart the C-in-C of Indian Army on 24^th Oct evening.  General Lockhart did not give this update to Nehru but to Mountbatten. Nehru came to know about this after 6 crucial hours from Mountbatten. Maharaja appealed for Indian assistance on 24^th Oct 11 PM. Defence Cabinet Committee (DCC)  met on 25^th Oct at 10 AM, Mountbatten view that since Maharaja had not acceded so it won’t be justified to send Indian forces to Kashmir prevailed. Though Indian Army was asked to prepare for the assistance/operation on an urgent basis and Shri V P Menon was sent to Kashmir to assess the situation and discuss the question of accession with Maharaja.  Menon was accompanied by Colonel Sam Manekshaw (later Field Marshal) and Wing Commander H C Dewan to Kashmir. Maharaja signed the Instrument of Accession on 26^th Oct. There were only two all weather air strips – Jammu and Srinagar but both were for Maharaja’s private light aircraft, not fit for heavy aircraft.  Srinagar airfield was like Jammu and kutcha grass strip and was usable only in summers and definitely not after Nov. Gilgit also had a short airstrip.

Role of British Officers

Junagadh Nawab announced on 15^th August 1947 the accession of his state to Pakistan. The accession was accepted after almost a month by Pakistan on 13^th Sept 1947. When the need of invasion of Junagadh arrived the three Service chiefs of Indian Army wrote a joint letter to the cabinet that Indian Armed Forces are not in a position to undertake a serious campaign (the same armed forces had come out with flying colors during WW II) and that British soldiers would not take part in any operation which would involve a clash with another Dominion. This was nothing sort of a mutiny and these officers should have been sacked. The three chiefs got a tongue lashing from the Governor General. Mountbatten managed to obtain the chairman ship of the Defence Committee of the Cabinet (DCC) normally PM should the chairman. By virtue of this office Mountbatten was almost always able to influence the decision of this committee.

DCC consisted of Governor General, PM, Deputy PM, Defence Minister and any other Minister the PM desired. This was different in Pakistan, there Political leadership enjoyed strict control over armed forces.

The DCC met on 26^th Oct. Mountbatten and three service chiefs opposed dispatch of troops to Kashmir as in their opinion the airlift involved great risks and danger. These were countered by Indians and it was decided that the risks were worth taking.  It was agreed to airlift troops to Srinagar the next day i.e. on 27^th Oct.

Sardar Patel at once requisitioned all available civil aircraft by means of a radio broadcast. 1 Sikh Battalion commanded by Lt Colonel Dewan Ranjit Rai was the first battalion to fly to Kashmir on 27^th Oct morning. RIAF aircraft Dakota played a crucial role. 1 Sikh was to land only if the Srinagar airport was not occupied by the raiders. The first plane landed at Srinagar airport by 1000 hrs on 27^th Oct. 27^th Oct was Eid. PM Nehru instructed Brigadier Hiralal Atal to send code word from Kashmir after reaching there. The ‘Lion’ code meant situation under control and more troops needed while ‘Jackal’ means it would be futile to send more troops. Brigadier sent the code word ‘Lion’ at 1000 hrs on 27^th Oct. The airfield was still not captured by the raiders though the aircraft who took wider circle got hit by the bullets though nothing serious happened.

Only 300 men were sent on 27^th Oct while raiders were more than 5000. During the first three days about 900 men with arms and ammunition were lifted to Srinagar and by 5^th day the entire 161 Brigade was airlifted.

Leaving one company for airfield protection, Ranjit Rai went forward to Baramula with two companies. He was engaged by the raiders on the outskirts of Baramula. He engaged the raiders for better part of 28^th Oct, in face of overwhelming numbers of raiders he withdrew from Baramula to Pattan, half-way between Baramula and Srinagar. During this withdrawal Rai achieved martyrdom. The remaining 1 Sikh were able to hold the raiders.

Battle of Badgam

This battle was caused by withdrawal of Indian forces from Baramula to Pattan on 28/29^th Oct, the enemy thought India was retreating so they advanced. On 3^rd Nov 1947 Major Somnath Sharma of 4 Kumaon held the invaders till his ammunition allowed him and sacrificed his life defending the Srinagar Airfield. His right arm was heavily plastered and yet he fought. He had one company (less than 150 men) and he was attacked by about 700 men. His company was surrounded by 1435 Hrs on 3^rd Nov. His men fought to the last round. He was posthumously awarded PVC. The RIAF machine-gunned the raiders and caused heavy causalities few hours later. About 200 raiders died in RIAF action. The raiders withdrew. By 3^rd Nov the immediate threat to Srinagar airfield had been averted.

Battle of Shalateng

The raiders were on Baramula – Pattan road. The offensive on raider’s position was launched on 7^th Nov. It was a combined attack of RIAF and Army. About 300 raiders were killed in this battle. Baramula was liberated on 8^th Nov. The remaining residents of Baramula welcomed Indian troops.

PM Nehru flew to Srinagar on 9^th Nov. Brigadier L P Sen played a commendable role in Kashmir operations. Uri was liberated on 12^th Nov. He wanted to pursue the raiders to Domel but higher authorities asked him to relieve besieged Poonch instead. With the capture of Uri, the liberation of the valley was complete. The raiders would never threaten the valley again. But we lost the opportunity to capture Muzaffarabad and this is costing us dearly.The raiders before joining the battle used to pray “Kali pagri ke kafiron aur khuda ka bachchon se bachao”. Kali pagri means black turbaned Sikh regiment troops while Khuda ka bachcha means RIAF.

Fall of Gilgit and siege of Skardu

Gilgit province was about 38,000 sq km large and is highly mountainous. The main towns are Gilgit, Skardu and Bunj.  These towns along with Dras and Kargil in Baltistan are important points of communication systems in the area. Kargil was connected to Srinagar via Dras and Zoji La. Gilgit also commanded one of the two main caravan routes from Srinagar via Burzil Pass and Minkata Pass to Kashgar.  An equally important route led eastwards along the Indus to Skardu and Kargil and onwards to Leh. Gilgit had that time a makeshift airstrip. There were no roads leading to Gilgit only tracks and passes.

Gilgit area was occupied by Sikhs in 1842 and Maharaja Gulab Singh in 1846. In 1852 there was a revolt and Dogra rule was thrown out. In 1860 Maharaja regained possession but the area never remained under effective rule of Srinagar. Gilgit came under British rule in 1889 and it took over the military and political administration of the tribal region.   
 In 1935 the entire Gilgit region was leased to British for 60 years. The lease lapsed in June 1947 because of British plan for departure. Maharajah appointed Brigadier Ghansara Singh as Governor of Gilgit on 30^th June 1947. He flew to Gilgit on 30^th June along with Major General H L Scott, Chief of J & K state forces. The local population welcomed the return of Maharaja Administration. Major William Brown was one senior British officer in Gilgit. The subordinate chiefs were Mir of Hunza, Mir of Nagar, Raja of Punial and chiefs of Kosh Ghizar. The Mirs of Hunza and Nagar were hostile. The Gilgit scouts mainly came from Hunza and Nagar regions and their commander was relative of both the Mirs. Maharaja failed to act against the hostile elements and Major Brown staged a coup with the aid of Agency staff and Gilgit scouts and imprisoned Brigadier Ghansara Singh on 31^st Oct 1947. At the time of this treachery, Gilgit was garrisoned by 6 J & K Infantry, less about 2 companies with headquarters at Bunji, about 54 km from Gilgit. The battalion comprised of Sikhs and Muslims in equal proportion. Captain Matheson, on instructions from Major Brown stormed and captured Bunji, massacred the Sikh troops. Major Brown hoisted the Pakistani flag on 3^rd Nov 1947. The region was taken over by Sardar Mohammed Khan. Major Brown returned to England in 1948 and he was awarded MBE by British government.

The news of the treachery at Gilgit reached Srinagar almost a week later. There were not enough forces to take any action against the treachery. On 21^st November 1947, Lt Colonel Sher Jung Thapa was asked to move to Skardu from Leh and defend Skardu with the remaining elements of 6 J&K Infantry. He reached Skardu on 3^rd Dec. He had just 40 Sikhs and 31 Muslim troops to defend Skardu against more than 600 hostiles. He fortified his defenses on Skardu fort. The strength of Thapa troops increased to 285 men by 15^th Feb because of reinforcements. The situation of Thapa was desperate by April 9, 1948 and he requested Srinagar for an immediate help. General Thimayya ordered Thapa to withdraw from Skardu and join another column near Marol on 16^th May. India had already lost Kargil and Dras by then so any help to Skardu was almost impossible.  Thapa said its impossible to withdraw as he had women and children along with combatants.  Lt General Thimayya asked RIAF to strike the invaders at Skardu but it was rejected. He raised the matter with Defense Minister. Defence Minister said it was not practical.

The RIAF went into action starting on 19^th June 1948, the raiders suffered heavy causalities. The RIAF dropped supplies but about 50% fell into enemy hands.

Under desperate situation and as ordered by General Thimayya, Thapa surrendered the fort on 15 August 1948 what followed was a massacre. All the Sikhs were shot dead. Thapa became a PoW and survived because he knew C-in-C Gracey of Pakistan Amry. The siege lasted more than 6 months. Thapa was awarded MVC. The Pakistani commanders reported back to HQ that “All Sikhs shot, all women raped”. The entire Hindu population of Skardu was reduced to ashes by Pakistani forces. We lost Skardu because Indian Army and RIAF did not fully appreciate its importance and failed to allocate adequate resources.

RIAF continued bombing Skardu and Gilgit. In Oct 1948 Skardu was heavily bombed by RIAF. RIAF also flew offensive operations in Chilas.

Ladakh

There are three important valleys in this region - Indus, Zanskar and Nubra. Zanskar is more remote and its in south while Nubra is in north.  Akshai Chin (now in Chinese hands), Baltistan, Skardu, Kargil are also parts of Ladakh plateau. Zoji La pass connects Ladakh plateau to the Kashmir valley. Srinagar can be reached from Leh through Dras via Zoji La. Leh was summer capital while Skardu was the winter capital of Ladakh.

In 1947, J & K State forces had only 8 Infantry battalions i.e. about 4000 men. One Battalion less two companies was deployed at Bunji, two platoons at Kargil, One company less a platoon was at Skardu and Leh had just one company less a platoon. After the departure of Thapa to Skardu only 33 men remained at Leh.

Operation Sledge was the code name for the capture of Leh, was planned by Pakistan Army and launched from Gilgit in mid Feb 1948. On 16 Feb, 1948 Brigadier L P Sen sent 1 platoon of 2 Dogras under Major Prithi Chand followed by two platoons so the State forces for the defence of Leh and to train the locals for the defence of Leh. Major Chand and his platoon reached Leh on 8 March 1948. He was accompanied by an energetic Ladakhi engineer Sonam Narboo. Narboo was assigned the task of making a makeshift airstrip at Leh. He made it ready by 6 April 1948.

Pakistani raiders made a 4 pronged attack simultaneously at Gund, Pindras, Dras and Kargil on 10^th May 1948. Only Kargil attack was successful. With the fall of Kargil, situation in Leh became desperate. The raiders were at the gates of Leh on 23^rd May 1948. The airfield was located at a height of 3256 m and RIAF had no experience of flying at that height, it was then the highest airfield in the world.

Air Commodore Mehar Singh created history on 24^th May 1948 when he landed his ancient Dakota at Leh negotiating the mountains towering more than 5000 m. His passenger was Major General Thimayya. It was an unprecedented feat. Dakota and other RIAF aircrafts had no Oxygen support. On 1^st June Mehar Singh led the RIAF 6 aircrafts to fly an entire company of one Gurkha Battalion to Leh. The local people were thrilled and they welcomed Indian forces with all the hospitality as their disposal. RIAF saved Leh at the most critical time of its history. More reinforcement s came through Manali route.

Dras fell to raiders in early June 1948. There was just one company of 1 Patiala between Dras and Srinagar to ensure Zoji La remains open. Leh was getting isolated. The raiders came close to Nimu only about 30 km from Leh on 12^th July, the situation of Leh again became desperate by 13^th July. But the defenders continued their valiant effort. Reinforcements arrived to Leh on 15^th August 1948.

Zoji La Operations

The raiders controlled all approaches to Zoji La from the Kargil side by 7 July. Indian Army made many attacks on the raider positions in Sept but all attempts failed to dislodge the raiders. RIAF also attacked bunkers with bombs. Kargil and Zoji La were in the hands of the raiders at the end of Sept 1948. These two locations are keys to the defence of Ladakh. It was necessary to clear them before the onset of winter.

Indian Army planned an all out offensive to capture Zoji La. Major General Thimayya personally flew an air reconnaissance mission over Zoji La on 15^th Oct 1948 piloted by Mehar Singh. There was a complete secrecy in bringing up the tanks. The tanks were brought from Jammu in complete secrecy. The attack finally went through on 1 Nov 1948. The attack was total and enemy was shocked. Zoji La pass was cleared within 12 hours. Indian offensive continued and RIAF bombed the enemy positions. Dras was captured on 13^th Nov. Kargil was captured on 23^rd Nov 1948. The onset of winter made any other operation impossible. Mehar Singh aka Mehar Baba was awarded MVC. He died in an air crash in 1952. For raiders he was either a magician or a prophet.

Western Operations

By 15^th Oct, the raiders had penetrated into Poonch and Mirpur. The focus of India was on saving valley so initially this sector did not receive much attention. The state forces had been surrounded by enemies at Mirpur, Kotli, Poonch, Jhangar, Naushara, Rajouri etc. These forces were sheltering thousands of lives almost exclusively all of them were non-Muslims. J & K PM M C Mahajan pleaded with Nehru on 3^rd Nov to save the besieged forces. RIAF carried out the recon of Kotli, Bagh, Muzaffarabad and Sangram areas on 3^rd Nov. RIAF attacked enemy positions in Kotli areas. Rajouri fell in Nov and about 30,000 persons were massacred and abducted and 1500 refugees at Chingas were killed.

Rawalkot was evacuated by state forces and joined Poonch garrison along with 600 refugees. Naushara and Jhangar were relieved by Nov 19. Kotli garrison was relieved on 27^th Nov and 9000 refugees were saved. Unfortunately the garrison at Mirpur could not be relieved due to paucity of troops but it managed to fight out its way to Jhangar bringing about 10,000 refugees.

C-in-C of Indian Army tried to persuade Indian PM Nehru to evacuate Poonch but Nehru declined.  It was an herculean task to maintain the besieged garrison at Poonch. There were about 40,000 refugees in the town. On 29^th March 1948, Poonch was completely surrounded.

The raiders were actively engaged in clearing out all Hindus from the areas between Akhnur and Bhimbar. Hindus were massacred in large numbers and villages were burnt. On 2^nd Dec, about 45,000 refugees crossed the Chenab river bridge and crossed to Jammu from Akhnur. Indian army captured Chhamb on 10^th Dec 1947 but RIAF lost two aircrafts in this effort. Jhangar was lost to raiders on 24^th Dec. It was a vital link between Mirpur and Kotli and not too far from Naushara. About 6000 raiders captured it. The 2500 strong raiders attacked Naushara on 24^th Dec night. The attack was successfully repulsed with heavy casualties on both sides.

Battle of Naushara

The enemy gathered in large numbers about 15000 strong and stormed Naushara on 6^th Feb 1948. Brigadier Usman was Indian commander in this sector. India achieved a decisive victory here and more than 2000 enemy troops were killed in the battle. Naushara was saved.

Capture of Rajouri

There were wide scale reports of barbaric actions taken on non-Muslims by the raiders in Rajouri town. The advance to Rajouri commenced on 8^th April 1948. Indians captured the town on 12^th April just in time to save the lives of 1500 refugees, mostly women. Of these, 300 to 500 had been lined up to be shot. The non-Muslims were massacred in large numbers and their decaying bodies were left in open pits. RIAF played a key role.

Advance to Tithwal

Tithwal lies to the north of Muzaffarabad. 1 Sikh captured Kupwara on 12^th Feb. The operation to capture Tithwal was launched on 18^th May and it was captured on 23^rd May with enemy withdrawing across the river Kishanganga. The Kishanganga bridge was attacked on 24^th April with the help of RIAF. It was a daring attack. Indians did not press the advantage here otherwise we could have threatened Muzaffarabad itself. Pakistan counterattacked and recaptured some vital ground. UNCIP visited India in July and on its appeal Indian Spring Offensive was halted. Pakistan exploited this situation and captured some grounds along Kishanganga river. In August India tried to damage Kishanganga bridge but failed.

Defence committee of the Cabinet in its meeting of 30^th Sept ordered for an appreciation to be prepared for the capture of Muzaffarabad and an attack on Mirpur. The appreciation was prepared by General Cariappa. The plan for invasion of Muzaffarabad and Mirpur did not come as ceasefire came into effect on  Jan 1949.

Relief of Poonch (Operation Punching)

Poonch had about 40,000 Hindu and Sikh refugees. It was attacked by raiders since Oct 1947. RIAF attacked the positions of raiders from 3^rd Nov 1947 onwards and blunted their attacks. There were about 3000 troops at Poonch - 2000 from J &K State forces and 1000 of Indian Army. The raiders encircled Poonch with the obvious aim of reducing the garrison by starving them and by their firepower.

Lt. Colonel Pritam Singh built a 600 yards long airstrip close to the town in late Nov 1947. The RIAF managed the garrison going through regular sorties. Mehar Singh landed Harvard on this ultra small strip. RIAF continued the supply of provisions and the garrison continued going against all odds. About 35,000 refugees were evacuated by the Dakotas. 9^th Gurkha Battalion was flown in from Jammu to Poonch to reinforce the garrison in Feb 1948.

To reduce the pressure on the air supply of food and to augment stocks, harvesting operations in the fields in the neighboring enemy-held areas were carried out by the refugees at Poonch. The refugees were escorted by the Indian troops.

The sorties of RIAF to Poonch were halted after March 1948 in face of accurate firings by Pakistani Army. The enemy noose tightened by Sept 1948 and they brought up 25 pounder guns. In the three phase operation Poonch was captured on 20^th Nov 1948 after almost one year siege.

Royal Indian Air Force played a stellar role in the defence of Jammu and Kashmir. Wing Commodore Mehar Singh achieved feats that only giants can achieve. It was the first war India fought and Indian Air Force did not let our country down.

Highly Recommended (9/10)

Book Review [132] : From Kutch to Tashkent

I have read few books on 1971 war but none on 1965. India and Pakistan both claim that they won it but the truth lies closer to Indian claim. India had in its possession more territory than Pakistan and Tashkent declaration was more favorable to India than Pakistan. This is also claimed by many neutral writers and even by somewhat pro-Pakistan writer Farooq Bajwa in his book 'From Kutch to Tashkent'.

The Genesis

General Ayub Khan became the President of Pakistan in 1958 after a military coup. He declared martial law in the country. Bhutto became the foreign minister of Pakistan in 1962, he was only 34. Ayub Khan introduced a new constitution of ‘indirect democracy’ in 1962. There was no provision of universal adult franchise.  There were 80,000 strong electorates handpicked by the regime. Fatima Jinnah, the sister of Muhammad Ali Jinnah, gave a tough fight to Ayub Khan in January 1965 Presidential elections. She secured 38, 691 votes out of 80,000 votes. Ayub Khan had to rig the elections to win Presidency. In order to secure popular support which he lost in the Presidential elections as people thronged in large numbers in Fatima Jinnah’s rallies, Ayub Khan triggered 1965 war. He also thought that India was weakened by the 1962 war, Shastri was not a great leader, Hindus have no stomach for fight, India was facing famine and economic crisis and China would support Pakistan and perhaps Pakistan would not get a better chance to shame India than in 1965.

  

USSR turned slightly warm towards Pakistan between 1962 and 1965. USSR refrained from any criticism of Pakistan in late 1962 in UNSC when Kashmir was being debated. US under Lyndon Johnson (Nov 1963 onwards) was not happy with Pakistan getting cozy with China and Lyndon Johnson warned Foreign Minister Bhutto in Nov 1963. Pakistan was also not happy with US giving military aid to India during and after 1962 war. Pakistan made a major shift in its foreign policy in April 1965 by making friendly gestures to China and USSR. Ayub Khan visited China in March 1965 and USSR in April 1965. He made an astonishing offer to USSR that if USSR agreed to stop Vetoing in UNSC favouring Indian position then Pakistan would ask US to dismantle its bases from Pakistan territory.  This softened the anti-Pakistan stance of USSR. But US did not like it and it cancelled the proposed visit of Ayub Khan to US in late April 1965. The US-Pakistan relations stretched to the maximum extent by then.

Fighting in Kutch

In January 1965 tension escalated between India and Pakistan over Kanjarkot fort (an abandoned fort in Rann of Kutch) when Indian Special Reserve Police found new track formed by heavy vehicles in the region that was south of the border as claimed by India. Pakistan claimed it as its own. Both sides started aggressive patrolling and a minor border skirmish broke out in April 1965. In May British PM Harold Wilson offered to negotiate. The ceasefire commenced on 1^st July 1965 and both sides agreed to retreat to 1^st Jan 1965 position. The dispute was referred to a 3 member arbitration panel whose members were nominated by India and Pakistan (one member each) and the third member was by UN Secretary General. It gave its award in 1968 and was a great victory for Pakistan as they defeated Indian forces in quick succession in Kutch region. Ayub Khan said that “Hindu has no stomach for a fight” and this belief became a cornerstone of all further Pakistan military decisions. US also objected to Pakistan use of US weapons against India as these weapons were not supposed to be used against any country in offensive operations. Pakistan also thought that the qualitative edge that it enjoyed against India in terms of weapons etc would even out once Indian modernization of military completes by late 1960s so 1965 was the best time to humiliate India militarily.

Operation Gibraltar

It was a daring plan to send thousands of Pakistani soldiers and paramilitaries from Azad Kashmir into Indian Kashmir disguised as Kashmiri guerillas, to engage Indian forces in Indian Kashmir as well as leading a popular civilian revolt against Indian rule. It was the first part followed by Operation Grand Slam. Both plans were prepared by General Akhtar Malik.

The Gibraltar forces were divided into six groups – Babur, Ghazanavi, Salahuddin, Khalid, Qasim and Tariq. The total strength was about 5 to 7 thousand troops. All the Gibraltar troops were to operate in civilian dress. Bhutto was the key person behind this idea.On 5^th August a large number of Pakistan forces infiltrated in India but were detected by India. India objected to U Thant Secretary General of UN about it and even the chief of UN Military Observer Group on India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) confirmed Indian position to the Secretary General. On 8^th August Voice of Kashmir radio station run from inside Kashmir declared the formation of the Revolutionary Council of Kashmir and called for the liberation war. But the majority of Kashmiris did not support the infiltrators.  India captured some Gibraltar force members and they disclosed the entire plan of Pakistan on All India Radio. Thus the operation ended in a great disaster.

India captured 3 Pakistani posts north of Kargil on 16^th August.  India attacked three Pakistan posts across the LOC in the Tithwal region (Uri-Poonch bulge) on 21^st August. India captured Haji Pir Pass on 28^th August. It was a strategic pass through which most of the provisions had to pass for Pakistan forces in the valley. The Gibraltar forces were now isolated in Kashmir.

Operation Grand Slam

It was the code name given to the plan for an armored thrust by 12 Division against Indian forces across the ‘cease fire line’ at Akhnur was a critical supply line for Indian forces from India to Srinagar. Ayub Khan gave green light to Operation Grand Slam on 29^th August; time was running out for Pakistan as Gibraltar forces were getting decimated by India so it was important to execute Grand Slam as soon as possible.  It was launched on 1^st Sept 0330 hrs. It was supported by massive artillery. It was launched in the Chhamb sector. India was caught by surprise. Indians withdrew to prevent Pakistan from crossing the Tawi River. By noon Pakistan had surrounded the Chhamb sector.

India launched airstrikes at 1700 hrs to relieve pressure and by sunset India has destroyed 13 Pakistan tanks and many armored vehicles and lost two Indian vampires. Pakistan has Paton tanks. India had centurions but they could not be sent because they were heavy and Akhnur bridge could not hold that weight.

UNMOGIP had warned India about Pakistan build up in Chhamb sector but India did not pay any attention. China declared support for Pakistan action on 4^th Sept 1965. The Foreign Minister of China visited Pakistan on 4^th Sept. UNSC asked Pakistan and India to order ceasefire and return to cease fire line as existed before but both countries refused. On 2^nd Sept Chhamb was taken. Pakistan had captured all area west of Tawi river. Indians retreated to defend Akhnoor and abandoned Chhamb.

On 2^nd Sept General Musa asked Major General Yahya Khan to take command of Operation Grandslam from Major General Akhtar Malik. No concrete reasons given or may be because Gibraltar and Grandslam did not produce the expected results. This changed the course of the war. Akhtar Malik was awarded Pakistan’s second highest gallantry award. He was Ahmadiya.

Ayub Khan was concerned with India fighting as all out war. His main aim was to highlight Kashmir issue and pressurize India to hold plebiscite on it.  He asked his men to consolidate the gains of Grandslam. On 5^th Sept Jaurian town was taken by Pakistan. Pakistan was within 4 miles of Akhnur. India crossed the Punjab border on 6^th Sept to relieve the pressure on Akhnur. Pakistan reluctance to capture Akhnur gave India a much needed space. Pakistan was supposed to capture Akhnur by 2^nd Sept but they did not do it even by 5^th Sept.

India had Centurion and Sherman tanks about 1400 in number while Pakistan had 900 tanks including 360 Paton tanks. Paton tanks had 90 mm gun, range of 1800 yards and equipped with infra red gun sight so that it can fight in night as well. While Indian tanks had 84 mm gun, range of 1200 yards and can not fight in night. Indian Air Force had an advantage of 210 Planes to 97 of Pakistan.

Operation Riddle

Indian Army Chief was General J N Choudhury and Lt. General Harbaksh Singh was GOC Western Command. Operation Riddle was the codename of the plan finalized by Lt. General Harbaksh Singh to assault Lahore. Lt. General Joginder Singh Dhillon was to lead the assault on Lahore. It was to be a three prong attack.  15^th Infantry Division led by Major General N. Prasad was to advance along the Amritsar-Lahore route, 7^th Infantry Division led by Major General S K Sibal was to move on the Harike-Khalra-Barki road and 4 Mountain Division led by Major General Gurbaksh Singh to enter along Khem Karan – Kasur route.

Operation began on 0330 hrs on 6^th Sept. Pakistan was taken by complete surprise but 3 Baluch and PAF slowed down the advance of 15^th Infantry Division under Prasad. General Prasad was sacked from his command as he failed to take advantage of the surprise element. Pakistan counter offensive caused heavy damage to Indians on 7^th Sept. Pakistan commanders showed exemplary leadership compared to Indians. The attack by 15^th Infantry Division was foiled in this region.

7 Infantry Division led by Major General S K Sibal crossed border on 6^th Sept and captured Barki village amidst great fighting on 10^th Sept. Major Aziz Bhatii of Pakistan was awarded highest gallantry award posthumously. 7 Infantry Division could not make any further gain.

Khem Karan – Kasur road was southernmost route of India’s three pronged assault on Lahore. Kasur (6 miles deep in Pakistan) and Khem Karan (1 mile in India) are crucial points. 4 Mountain Division failed in its objective and proved to be the weakest link. It retreated to Indian border on 8^th Sept after suffering heavy causalities losing almost half of its fighting capability.

Operation Riddle achieved its objective of halting Pakistan’s capture of Akhnur but failed in capturing Lahore. Indian Artillery proved to be highly ineffective compared to Pakistan’s. Pakistan launched counter offensive Operation Mailed Fist.

Operation Mailed Fist

It was launched in Khem Karan front as it was the weakest link of India. 4 Mountain Division had already suffered heavy losses in this front. It was to be led by famous 1 Armored Division. 4 Mountain Division’s morale was very low and was suffering from desertions.  Operation Mailed Fist had to be a kind of Blitzkrieg. The Operation started at 0430 hrs on 8^th Sept. by 1100 hrs Pakistan had captured Khem Karan. The town was abandoned by Indian forces. Pakistan division penetrated 8 miles deep but retreated back to Khem Karan for refueling and also it did not have infantry support. This was a major blunder as India got 1 crucial day to prepare the defenses.  Indian 2^nd Independent Armored Brigade reached the border on 9^th Sept at 0400 hrs. It was placed under the command of 4 Mountain Division. Operation Mailed Fist resumed on 9^th Morning but now the 18 Rajputana Rifles gave a tough fight as Asal Uttar and Pakistan 6 Lancers had to retreat.

Pakistan made the third and final push on 10^th Sept morning.  India used the sugarcane field to hide her tanks and breached the Rohi Nala. The Paton tanks were bogged down in the marsh and about 70 Pakistan tanks were destroyed by India 6 mm recoilless guns mounted on Jeeps. Grenadier Havildar Abdul Hamid was awarded PVC for destroying 3 Pakistan tanks by his 6 mm recoilless gun. Pakistan did not know that Asal Uttar was head quarter of 4 Mountain Division. 4 Mountain Division saved India and by 11^th Sept Operation Mailed Fist decisively failed.

UN asked for ceasefire on 6^th Sept, both sides refused. US applied total embargo on military aid and sales to India and Pakistan on 8^th Sept. Britain was harsher on India. It stopped all military aid to India wef 6^th Sept. Britain said CENTO did not apply within commonwealth. US did not help Pakistan and Pakistan took it as a great betrayal. Pakistan had just 3 to 4 weeks of fighting capability. China was not even a member of UN and Taiwan was occupying China seat in UNSC (till 25^th Oct 1971). Any direct assistance from China would have irrevocably ruptured US-Pakistan relations. China declared on 7^th Sept that Indian attack was a naked aggression. China gave assurance to Pakistan that if India attacked East Pakistan then China would attack India in Bengal and northern border. Chinese forces were put on high alert on Sikkim border and China gave an ultimatum to India. Indonesia, Iran and Turkey also supported Pakistan. Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Iraq gave diplomatic support to Pakistan. Ethiopia and Yugoslavia had supported India

Operation Nepal

This was the operation of assaulting Sialkot. 1 Armored Division was India’s main armored strike force. It was led by Major General Rajinder Singh ‘Sparrow’.  Operation objective was to draw into battle and destroy Pakistan armour. Operation commenced at 2300 hrs on 7^th Sept.

Indian Army reached within 5 miles of Sialkot on 8^th Sept. Brigadier Ismail, GOC 15 Division was relieved of his command at 0660 hrs because of poor defense and replaced by Major General Tikka Khan. The famous Indian 1 Armored Division was not able to make any progress because of downpour or assault by PAF and the communication broke down between Infantry and Armour. Indians halted their assault to see the result of the great battle of Asal Uttar.

India decisively won the battle on 10^th Sept and on 11^th Sept 1 Armored Division of India advanced on two fronts, Charwa-Chawinda and Kaloi-Pogowal towards Phillora town. Despite fierce Pakistani resistance Indians managed to capture the town at 1530 hrs on 11 Sept. India’s 14 Infantry Division failed to capture Zafarwal but it captured Bhagowal town by 0600 hrs on 13^th Sept.

1 Armored Division fought fierce battle with Pakistan forces involving armour, artillery and infantry between 1200 and 1800 hrs on 14^th Sept but failed to conquer Chawinda town. PAF played a crucial role in defense of Chawinda town. 6 Armored Division was defending Chawinda town. The Battle of Chawinda is considered biggest tank battle after WW 1 and resulted in Indian defeat. India’s formidable 1 Armored Division failed to make any impact beyond Chawinda just like Pakistan’s 1 Armored Division in case of Asal Uttar. India lost close to 100 tanks while Pakistan about 70. India still held much of Pakistan territory in Sialkot region even after its failure to capture Chawinda town.

Eastern Front

No action of this front. Eastern command was under General Sam Manekshaw.  Pakistan had 1 division while India had 11 divisions. So Pakistan did not take any chance. There were occasional air raids in this sector.

Air and Naval War

On the night of 7/8 Sept two Pakistani destroyers bombarded the Indian post of Dwarka, the town sacred to Hindus. Indian Navy was caught napping.  India did not retaliate.

Pakistan had 17 Squadrons including the most advanced F-104 Starfighter (12 in number) which can fly at Mach 2 (twice the speed of sound). It was supplied to Pakistan by US in 1961 despite of Indian objections. In numbers India had a decisive superiority.

PAF raided IAF bases on 6^th Sept at Pathankot, Adampur and Halwara from Sargodha and Peshawar bases and destroyed many Indian aircraft on ground. The objective was to destroy as many Indian planes as possible to minimize Indian numerical superiority.  IAF retaliated but Pakistan was well prepared and India suffered losses.

Pressure for Cease fire

Pakistan situation was very desperate because of poor industrial base and US arms embargo. China on 16^th Sept gave ultimatum of three days until 19^th sept to India to dismantle the border installations on Indo-China border, stop the intrusions and undertake not to carry out any more raids across the border. Shastri offered a joint Indo-China commission to examine the truth of the accusations. Because of Chinese pro-Pakistan stance USSR continued supply of weapons to India during the war.

Turkey had given military assistance to Pakistan which included F-86 fighter jets, anti-tank guided missiles, mortar shells, ammunitions etc.

Bhutto was not keen on ceasefire and wanted Indian forces out of Kashmir as a pre condition for a ceasefire while Ayub Khan did not want to antagonize US. It was Bhutto who was behind the war though Ayub Khan cannot hide behind this excuse. Ayub Khan wanted a face saving device in form of a UNSC resolution on Kashmir issue.

Ayub Khan flew to China in complete secrecy on 20^th Sept and met Zhou En Lai. Zhou advised him to prepare for a long drawn war against India and promised Chinese support. Pakistan was not prepared for a long drawn war. China was ready to support Pakistan on whatever decision Pakistan was going to take.

UNSC passed a resolution 211 on Kashmir under Article 40 on 20^th Sept. It demanded that ceasefire should take effect on 22^nd Sept 1965 at 0700 hrs GMT. Both countries should withdraw their personnel to the positions held by them before 5^th August 1965. UNSC also said that it is convinced that ceasefire is essential as first step towards a peaceful settlement of outstanding differences between two countries over Kashmir. There were no assurances of any binding arbitration over Kashmir.

India was ready to accept resolution as it was wary of Chinese ultimatum. Ayub blamed India for exaggerating Chinese threat. India accepted the UNSC Resolution on 22^nd Sept. Bhutto travelled to UN on 21^st Sept. After the Indian acceptance of UNSC Resolution, Ayub Khan directed Bhutto to do the same. Bhutto made an emotional speech on 22^nd Sept in UN and agreed to UNSC Resolution. He also threatened to leave UN if UN failed to resolve the issue this time, this threat was quickly and firmly denied by Pakistan. Ayub Khan addressed the nation on TV. Millions of people heard him with surprise and anger, many in the Armed forces wept as he spoke. The war was effectively over by 23^rd Sept. Pakistan was not in a position to win the war and for India it would have been a very expensive victory.

Firing had stopped but both the countries remained with the occupation of the captured territory. USSR offered to host a summit between India and Pakistan at Tashkent after the ceasefire. It was accepted by India on 22^nd Sept but resisted by Pakistan.

As per US evaluation India won the war but her performance was not upto the mark. India lost 300 tanks while Pakistan 250. India had gained more territory and suffered less proportionate losses.

Britain and US probed India to give some concessions to Pakistan over Kashmir but Shastri confidently refused. India was now seen as more confident and proud of its ability to stand up to China and Pakistan at the same time.

Pakistan accepted to participate in the Tashkent summit on 8^th Dec. Ayub Khan went to address UN in Dec (13^th) and met US president on 14^th and 15^th Dec. Ayub Khan in his address in UN GA criticized India’s position on Kashmir which caused Indian walkout. In his meeting with Ayub Khan, US President Johnson warned Ayub Khan that Bhutto was a dangerous man. US also clarified that It was not in any position to pressurize India on Kashmir and it was better for Pakistan to attend Tashkent summit with open mind. US did not give any assurance to Pakistan. US special relationship with Pakistan was over for a while. Pakistan senior ministers blamed Bhutto for the entire mess and cooling of relations with US. Ayub Khan had said that Pakistan cannot be sacrificed for the sake of Kashmir and Bhutto was blamed for risking Pakistan for Kashmir.

Tashkent Summit

Indian and Pakistan delegations arrived at Tashkent on 3^rd Dec. USSR PM Alexei Kosygin personally hosted the summit.  India’s main conditions were that Pakistan should accept the Cease fire line as the international border in Kashmir, a no-war pact and Pakistan should not repeat Gibraltar kind of adventure. India also was not ready for any concession on Kashmir. Pakistan wanted resolution of Kashmir dispute either by agreement or plebiscite.  Ayub Khan told Kosygin that he would not shake hands with Shastri the next day as the photo would have a negative effect in Pakistan. Kosygin reacted with anger to this and said that Shastri deserved respect as head of state. Ayub Khan backed down.

Ayub Khan, Shastri and Kosygin made speeches on 4^th January. Shastri speech was received with applause by all present except Bhutto who had to be nudged by Ayub Khan to join in. UNSC Resolution 211 had called for the ceasefire and withdrawal of forces to 5^th August state. This would mean that India had to give up Hazi Pir Pass and other areas. Indian PM Shastri discussed this with Foreign Minister Swaran Singh and Defence Minister Y B Chavan who were with him for the talks. They agreed to give up these territories for peace sake. On 5^th January India gave first concession. It agreed to give up gains in Kashmir. Soviet found Ayub as decent while Bhutto as obstructive. Ayub Khan pleaded Shastri in Urdu on 7^th Jan “Kashmir ke mamle main kuch aisa kar dijiye ki main apne mulk main munh dikhane ke kabil rahoon”. Shastri replied “Sadar Sahib, Main bahut maafi chahta hoon ki main is mamle main apki koi khidmat nahin kar sakta”.

China threatened India on 8^th Jan that it would strike back resolutely against aggressive Indian behavior on border. On 9^th Kosygin tried to persuade Shastri to make some more concession on Kashmir. Shastri said that he would rather resign and give up politics then compromise Indian position. Kosygin backtracked.

Tashkent declaration was signed on 10^th Jan 1966. The main points were:

•          ·            India and Pakistan would settle their disputes through peaceful means.
•          ·            Armed forces would withdraw to 5 August position by 24^th Feb 1966.

Declaration was a major diplomatic triumph for India. Kashmir issue was not discussed. Bhutto refused to applaud the signing ceremony.  On 10^th/11^th night after the banquet Shastri died of heart attack in his sleep. He had survived two heart attacks before. Shastri was short in physical stature but stood up to the much larger size of Ayub. At the airport, after a gentle gesture from Kosygin, Ayub assisted Kosygin in lifting Shastri’s coffin on to the aeroplane going back to India.

There were angry student protests against the Tashkent declaration. Pakistan information ministry had earlier misled the people that Pakistan had won the war.

British response to the Indian attack on Lahore had caused the British to be viewed by India as a ‘Semi-Hostile Nation’. India was disappointed by lack of international support and even the USSR did not condemn Pakistan infiltration of August 1965. China threat on 16^th Sept to India had led to both USSR and USA warnings to China but Britain had remained muted.

Ayub Khan took the gamble that Grandslam and Gibraltar won’t trigger all out war with India. He also misjudged Indian Army and Shastri. Both countries refrained from bombing civilian targets and both countries observed Geneva Convention.

US thinking

Robert Komer, the National Security Adviser to Lyndon Johnson, wrote in his account that when Johnson became President of US after the assassination of JFK, he asked to explain JFK’s pro India stance. He said he liked Ayub and Indians were the worst people to deal with he had ever seen. Komer replied  that Pakistan are Aryans and their forefathers were Aryan invaders of India, Hindu philosophy is very antithetical to our way of thinking and Mohammedism is much closer to western thought but India has 6 times more people than Pakistan and can act as counterweight to communist China. 

Its a great book and offers almost a neutral assessment of the war though the tinge of pro-Pakistan bias exists throughout the book.

Highly Recommended (9/10)