Tuesday, July 19, 2016

Book Review [132] : From Kutch to Tashkent



I have read few books on 1971 war but none on 1965. India and Pakistan both claim that they won it but the truth lies closer to Indian claim. India had in its possession more territory than Pakistan and Tashkent declaration was more favorable to India than Pakistan. This is also claimed by many neutral writers and even by somewhat pro-Pakistan writer Farooq Bajwa in his book 'From Kutch to Tashkent'.

The Genesis
General Ayub Khan became the President of Pakistan in 1958 after a military coup. He declared martial law in the country. Bhutto became the foreign minister of Pakistan in 1962, he was only 34. Ayub Khan introduced a new constitution of ‘indirect democracy’ in 1962. There was no provision of universal adult franchise.  There were 80,000 strong electorates handpicked by the regime. Fatima Jinnah, the sister of Muhammad Ali Jinnah, gave a tough fight to Ayub Khan in January 1965 Presidential elections. She secured 38, 691 votes out of 80,000 votes. Ayub Khan had to rig the elections to win Presidency. In order to secure popular support which he lost in the Presidential elections as people thronged in large numbers in Fatima Jinnah’s rallies, Ayub Khan triggered 1965 war. He also thought that India was weakened by the 1962 war, Shastri was not a great leader, Hindus have no stomach for fight, India was facing famine and economic crisis and China would support Pakistan and perhaps Pakistan would not get a better chance to shame India than in 1965.
  
USSR turned slightly warm towards Pakistan between 1962 and 1965. USSR refrained from any criticism of Pakistan in late 1962 in UNSC when Kashmir was being debated. US under Lyndon Johnson (Nov 1963 onwards) was not happy with Pakistan getting cozy with China and Lyndon Johnson warned Foreign Minister Bhutto in Nov 1963. Pakistan was also not happy with US giving military aid to India during and after 1962 war. Pakistan made a major shift in its foreign policy in April 1965 by making friendly gestures to China and USSR. Ayub Khan visited China in March 1965 and USSR in April 1965. He made an astonishing offer to USSR that if USSR agreed to stop Vetoing in UNSC favouring Indian position then Pakistan would ask US to dismantle its bases from Pakistan territory.  This softened the anti-Pakistan stance of USSR. But US did not like it and it cancelled the proposed visit of Ayub Khan to US in late April 1965. The US-Pakistan relations stretched to the maximum extent by then.

Fighting in Kutch
In January 1965 tension escalated between India and Pakistan over Kanjarkot fort (an abandoned fort in Rann of Kutch) when Indian Special Reserve Police found new track formed by heavy vehicles in the region that was south of the border as claimed by India. Pakistan claimed it as its own. Both sides started aggressive patrolling and a minor border skirmish broke out in April 1965. In May British PM Harold Wilson offered to negotiate. The ceasefire commenced on 1st July 1965 and both sides agreed to retreat to 1st Jan 1965 position. The dispute was referred to a 3 member arbitration panel whose members were nominated by India and Pakistan (one member each) and the third member was by UN Secretary General. It gave its award in 1968 and was a great victory for Pakistan as they defeated Indian forces in quick succession in Kutch region. Ayub Khan said that “Hindu has no stomach for a fight” and this belief became a cornerstone of all further Pakistan military decisions. US also objected to Pakistan use of US weapons against India as these weapons were not supposed to be used against any country in offensive operations. Pakistan also thought that the qualitative edge that it enjoyed against India in terms of weapons etc would even out once Indian modernization of military completes by late 1960s so 1965 was the best time to humiliate India militarily.

Operation Gibraltar
It was a daring plan to send thousands of Pakistani soldiers and paramilitaries from Azad Kashmir into Indian Kashmir disguised as Kashmiri guerillas, to engage Indian forces in Indian Kashmir as well as leading a popular civilian revolt against Indian rule. It was the first part followed by Operation Grand Slam. Both plans were prepared by General Akhtar Malik.
The Gibraltar forces were divided into six groups – Babur, Ghazanavi, Salahuddin, Khalid, Qasim and Tariq. The total strength was about 5 to 7 thousand troops. All the Gibraltar troops were to operate in civilian dress. Bhutto was the key person behind this idea.On 5th August a large number of Pakistan forces infiltrated in India but were detected by India. India objected to U Thant Secretary General of UN about it and even the chief of UN Military Observer Group on India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) confirmed Indian position to the Secretary General. On 8th August Voice of Kashmir radio station run from inside Kashmir declared the formation of the Revolutionary Council of Kashmir and called for the liberation war. But the majority of Kashmiris did not support the infiltrators.  India captured some Gibraltar force members and they disclosed the entire plan of Pakistan on All India Radio. Thus the operation ended in a great disaster.

India captured 3 Pakistani posts north of Kargil on 16th August.  India attacked three Pakistan posts across the LOC in the Tithwal region (Uri-Poonch bulge) on 21st August. India captured Haji Pir Pass on 28th August. It was a strategic pass through which most of the provisions had to pass for Pakistan forces in the valley. The Gibraltar forces were now isolated in Kashmir.

Operation Grand Slam
It was the code name given to the plan for an armored thrust by 12 Division against Indian forces across the ‘cease fire line’ at Akhnur was a critical supply line for Indian forces from India to Srinagar. Ayub Khan gave green light to Operation Grand Slam on 29th August; time was running out for Pakistan as Gibraltar forces were getting decimated by India so it was important to execute Grand Slam as soon as possible.  It was launched on 1st Sept 0330 hrs. It was supported by massive artillery. It was launched in the Chhamb sector. India was caught by surprise. Indians withdrew to prevent Pakistan from crossing the Tawi River. By noon Pakistan had surrounded the Chhamb sector.
India launched airstrikes at 1700 hrs to relieve pressure and by sunset India has destroyed 13 Pakistan tanks and many armored vehicles and lost two Indian vampires. Pakistan has Paton tanks. India had centurions but they could not be sent because they were heavy and Akhnur bridge could not hold that weight.
UNMOGIP had warned India about Pakistan build up in Chhamb sector but India did not pay any attention. China declared support for Pakistan action on 4th Sept 1965. The Foreign Minister of China visited Pakistan on 4th Sept. UNSC asked Pakistan and India to order ceasefire and return to cease fire line as existed before but both countries refused. On 2nd Sept Chhamb was taken. Pakistan had captured all area west of Tawi river. Indians retreated to defend Akhnoor and abandoned Chhamb.
On 2nd Sept General Musa asked Major General Yahya Khan to take command of Operation Grandslam from Major General Akhtar Malik. No concrete reasons given or may be because Gibraltar and Grandslam did not produce the expected results. This changed the course of the war. Akhtar Malik was awarded Pakistan’s second highest gallantry award. He was Ahmadiya.

Ayub Khan was concerned with India fighting as all out war. His main aim was to highlight Kashmir issue and pressurize India to hold plebiscite on it.  He asked his men to consolidate the gains of Grandslam. On 5th Sept Jaurian town was taken by Pakistan. Pakistan was within 4 miles of Akhnur. India crossed the Punjab border on 6th Sept to relieve the pressure on Akhnur. Pakistan reluctance to capture Akhnur gave India a much needed space. Pakistan was supposed to capture Akhnur by 2nd Sept but they did not do it even by 5th Sept.
India had Centurion and Sherman tanks about 1400 in number while Pakistan had 900 tanks including 360 Paton tanks. Paton tanks had 90 mm gun, range of 1800 yards and equipped with infra red gun sight so that it can fight in night as well. While Indian tanks had 84 mm gun, range of 1200 yards and can not fight in night. Indian Air Force had an advantage of 210 Planes to 97 of Pakistan.

Operation Riddle
Indian Army Chief was General J N Choudhury and Lt. General Harbaksh Singh was GOC Western Command. Operation Riddle was the codename of the plan finalized by Lt. General Harbaksh Singh to assault Lahore. Lt. General Joginder Singh Dhillon was to lead the assault on Lahore. It was to be a three prong attack.  15th Infantry Division led by Major General N. Prasad was to advance along the Amritsar-Lahore route, 7th Infantry Division led by Major General S K Sibal was to move on the Harike-Khalra-Barki road and 4 Mountain Division led by Major General Gurbaksh Singh to enter along Khem Karan – Kasur route.
Operation began on 0330 hrs on 6th Sept. Pakistan was taken by complete surprise but 3 Baluch and PAF slowed down the advance of 15th Infantry Division under Prasad. General Prasad was sacked from his command as he failed to take advantage of the surprise element. Pakistan counter offensive caused heavy damage to Indians on 7th Sept. Pakistan commanders showed exemplary leadership compared to Indians. The attack by 15th Infantry Division was foiled in this region.
7 Infantry Division led by Major General S K Sibal crossed border on 6th Sept and captured Barki village amidst great fighting on 10th Sept. Major Aziz Bhatii of Pakistan was awarded highest gallantry award posthumously. 7 Infantry Division could not make any further gain.
Khem Karan – Kasur road was southernmost route of India’s three pronged assault on Lahore. Kasur (6 miles deep in Pakistan) and Khem Karan (1 mile in India) are crucial points. 4 Mountain Division failed in its objective and proved to be the weakest link. It retreated to Indian border on 8th Sept after suffering heavy causalities losing almost half of its fighting capability.
Operation Riddle achieved its objective of halting Pakistan’s capture of Akhnur but failed in capturing Lahore. Indian Artillery proved to be highly ineffective compared to Pakistan’s. Pakistan launched counter offensive Operation Mailed Fist.

Operation Mailed Fist
It was launched in Khem Karan front as it was the weakest link of India. 4 Mountain Division had already suffered heavy losses in this front. It was to be led by famous 1 Armored Division. 4 Mountain Division’s morale was very low and was suffering from desertions.  Operation Mailed Fist had to be a kind of Blitzkrieg. The Operation started at 0430 hrs on 8th Sept. by 1100 hrs Pakistan had captured Khem Karan. The town was abandoned by Indian forces. Pakistan division penetrated 8 miles deep but retreated back to Khem Karan for refueling and also it did not have infantry support. This was a major blunder as India got 1 crucial day to prepare the defenses.  Indian 2nd Independent Armored Brigade reached the border on 9th Sept at 0400 hrs. It was placed under the command of 4 Mountain Division. Operation Mailed Fist resumed on 9th Morning but now the 18 Rajputana Rifles gave a tough fight as Asal Uttar and Pakistan 6 Lancers had to retreat.
Pakistan made the third and final push on 10th Sept morning.  India used the sugarcane field to hide her tanks and breached the Rohi Nala. The Paton tanks were bogged down in the marsh and about 70 Pakistan tanks were destroyed by India 6 mm recoilless guns mounted on Jeeps. Grenadier Havildar Abdul Hamid was awarded PVC for destroying 3 Pakistan tanks by his 6 mm recoilless gun. Pakistan did not know that Asal Uttar was head quarter of 4 Mountain Division. 4 Mountain Division saved India and by 11th Sept Operation Mailed Fist decisively failed.

UN asked for ceasefire on 6th Sept, both sides refused. US applied total embargo on military aid and sales to India and Pakistan on 8th Sept. Britain was harsher on India. It stopped all military aid to India wef 6th Sept. Britain said CENTO did not apply within commonwealth. US did not help Pakistan and Pakistan took it as a great betrayal. Pakistan had just 3 to 4 weeks of fighting capability. China was not even a member of UN and Taiwan was occupying China seat in UNSC (till 25th Oct 1971). Any direct assistance from China would have irrevocably ruptured US-Pakistan relations. China declared on 7th Sept that Indian attack was a naked aggression. China gave assurance to Pakistan that if India attacked East Pakistan then China would attack India in Bengal and northern border. Chinese forces were put on high alert on Sikkim border and China gave an ultimatum to India. Indonesia, Iran and Turkey also supported Pakistan. Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Iraq gave diplomatic support to Pakistan. Ethiopia and Yugoslavia had supported India


Operation Nepal
This was the operation of assaulting Sialkot. 1 Armored Division was India’s main armored strike force. It was led by Major General Rajinder Singh ‘Sparrow’.  Operation objective was to draw into battle and destroy Pakistan armour. Operation commenced at 2300 hrs on 7th Sept.
Indian Army reached within 5 miles of Sialkot on 8th Sept. Brigadier Ismail, GOC 15 Division was relieved of his command at 0660 hrs because of poor defense and replaced by Major General Tikka Khan. The famous Indian 1 Armored Division was not able to make any progress because of downpour or assault by PAF and the communication broke down between Infantry and Armour. Indians halted their assault to see the result of the great battle of Asal Uttar.
India decisively won the battle on 10th Sept and on 11th Sept 1 Armored Division of India advanced on two fronts, Charwa-Chawinda and Kaloi-Pogowal towards Phillora town. Despite fierce Pakistani resistance Indians managed to capture the town at 1530 hrs on 11 Sept. India’s 14 Infantry Division failed to capture Zafarwal but it captured Bhagowal town by 0600 hrs on 13th Sept.
1 Armored Division fought fierce battle with Pakistan forces involving armour, artillery and infantry between 1200 and 1800 hrs on 14th Sept but failed to conquer Chawinda town. PAF played a crucial role in defense of Chawinda town. 6 Armored Division was defending Chawinda town. The Battle of Chawinda is considered biggest tank battle after WW 1 and resulted in Indian defeat. India’s formidable 1 Armored Division failed to make any impact beyond Chawinda just like Pakistan’s 1 Armored Division in case of Asal Uttar. India lost close to 100 tanks while Pakistan about 70. India still held much of Pakistan territory in Sialkot region even after its failure to capture Chawinda town.


Eastern Front
No action of this front. Eastern command was under General Sam Manekshaw.  Pakistan had 1 division while India had 11 divisions. So Pakistan did not take any chance. There were occasional air raids in this sector.


Air and Naval War
On the night of 7/8 Sept two Pakistani destroyers bombarded the Indian post of Dwarka, the town sacred to Hindus. Indian Navy was caught napping.  India did not retaliate.
Pakistan had 17 Squadrons including the most advanced F-104 Starfighter (12 in number) which can fly at Mach 2 (twice the speed of sound). It was supplied to Pakistan by US in 1961 despite of Indian objections. In numbers India had a decisive superiority.
PAF raided IAF bases on 6th Sept at Pathankot, Adampur and Halwara from Sargodha and Peshawar bases and destroyed many Indian aircraft on ground. The objective was to destroy as many Indian planes as possible to minimize Indian numerical superiority.  IAF retaliated but Pakistan was well prepared and India suffered losses.

Pressure for Cease fire
Pakistan situation was very desperate because of poor industrial base and US arms embargo. China on 16th Sept gave ultimatum of three days until 19th sept to India to dismantle the border installations on Indo-China border, stop the intrusions and undertake not to carry out any more raids across the border. Shastri offered a joint Indo-China commission to examine the truth of the accusations. Because of Chinese pro-Pakistan stance USSR continued supply of weapons to India during the war.
Turkey had given military assistance to Pakistan which included F-86 fighter jets, anti-tank guided missiles, mortar shells, ammunitions etc.
Bhutto was not keen on ceasefire and wanted Indian forces out of Kashmir as a pre condition for a ceasefire while Ayub Khan did not want to antagonize US. It was Bhutto who was behind the war though Ayub Khan cannot hide behind this excuse. Ayub Khan wanted a face saving device in form of a UNSC resolution on Kashmir issue.
Ayub Khan flew to China in complete secrecy on 20th Sept and met Zhou En Lai. Zhou advised him to prepare for a long drawn war against India and promised Chinese support. Pakistan was not prepared for a long drawn war. China was ready to support Pakistan on whatever decision Pakistan was going to take.

UNSC passed a resolution 211 on Kashmir under Article 40 on 20th Sept. It demanded that ceasefire should take effect on 22nd Sept 1965 at 0700 hrs GMT. Both countries should withdraw their personnel to the positions held by them before 5th August 1965. UNSC also said that it is convinced that ceasefire is essential as first step towards a peaceful settlement of outstanding differences between two countries over Kashmir. There were no assurances of any binding arbitration over Kashmir.

India was ready to accept resolution as it was wary of Chinese ultimatum. Ayub blamed India for exaggerating Chinese threat. India accepted the UNSC Resolution on 22nd Sept. Bhutto travelled to UN on 21st Sept. After the Indian acceptance of UNSC Resolution, Ayub Khan directed Bhutto to do the same. Bhutto made an emotional speech on 22nd Sept in UN and agreed to UNSC Resolution. He also threatened to leave UN if UN failed to resolve the issue this time, this threat was quickly and firmly denied by Pakistan. Ayub Khan addressed the nation on TV. Millions of people heard him with surprise and anger, many in the Armed forces wept as he spoke. The war was effectively over by 23rd Sept. Pakistan was not in a position to win the war and for India it would have been a very expensive victory.

Firing had stopped but both the countries remained with the occupation of the captured territory. USSR offered to host a summit between India and Pakistan at Tashkent after the ceasefire. It was accepted by India on 22nd Sept but resisted by Pakistan.
As per US evaluation India won the war but her performance was not upto the mark. India lost 300 tanks while Pakistan 250. India had gained more territory and suffered less proportionate losses.
Britain and US probed India to give some concessions to Pakistan over Kashmir but Shastri confidently refused. India was now seen as more confident and proud of its ability to stand up to China and Pakistan at the same time.
Pakistan accepted to participate in the Tashkent summit on 8th Dec. Ayub Khan went to address UN in Dec (13th) and met US president on 14th and 15th Dec. Ayub Khan in his address in UN GA criticized India’s position on Kashmir which caused Indian walkout. In his meeting with Ayub Khan, US President Johnson warned Ayub Khan that Bhutto was a dangerous man. US also clarified that It was not in any position to pressurize India on Kashmir and it was better for Pakistan to attend Tashkent summit with open mind. US did not give any assurance to Pakistan. US special relationship with Pakistan was over for a while. Pakistan senior ministers blamed Bhutto for the entire mess and cooling of relations with US. Ayub Khan had said that Pakistan cannot be sacrificed for the sake of Kashmir and Bhutto was blamed for risking Pakistan for Kashmir.

Tashkent Summit
Indian and Pakistan delegations arrived at Tashkent on 3rd Dec. USSR PM Alexei Kosygin personally hosted the summit.  India’s main conditions were that Pakistan should accept the Cease fire line as the international border in Kashmir, a no-war pact and Pakistan should not repeat Gibraltar kind of adventure. India also was not ready for any concession on Kashmir. Pakistan wanted resolution of Kashmir dispute either by agreement or plebiscite.  Ayub Khan told Kosygin that he would not shake hands with Shastri the next day as the photo would have a negative effect in Pakistan. Kosygin reacted with anger to this and said that Shastri deserved respect as head of state. Ayub Khan backed down.
Ayub Khan, Shastri and Kosygin made speeches on 4th January. Shastri speech was received with applause by all present except Bhutto who had to be nudged by Ayub Khan to join in. UNSC Resolution 211 had called for the ceasefire and withdrawal of forces to 5th August state. This would mean that India had to give up Hazi Pir Pass and other areas. Indian PM Shastri discussed this with Foreign Minister Swaran Singh and Defence Minister Y B Chavan who were with him for the talks. They agreed to give up these territories for peace sake. On 5th January India gave first concession. It agreed to give up gains in Kashmir. Soviet found Ayub as decent while Bhutto as obstructive. Ayub Khan pleaded Shastri in Urdu on 7th Jan “Kashmir ke mamle main kuch aisa kar dijiye ki main apne mulk main munh dikhane ke kabil rahoon”. Shastri replied “Sadar Sahib, Main bahut maafi chahta hoon ki main is mamle main apki koi khidmat nahin kar sakta”.

China threatened India on 8th Jan that it would strike back resolutely against aggressive Indian behavior on border. On 9th Kosygin tried to persuade Shastri to make some more concession on Kashmir. Shastri said that he would rather resign and give up politics then compromise Indian position. Kosygin backtracked.

Tashkent declaration was signed on 10th Jan 1966. The main points were:

  •          ·            India and Pakistan would settle their disputes through peaceful means.
  •          ·            Armed forces would withdraw to 5 August position by 24th Feb 1966.


Declaration was a major diplomatic triumph for India. Kashmir issue was not discussed. Bhutto refused to applaud the signing ceremony.  On 10th/11th night after the banquet Shastri died of heart attack in his sleep. He had survived two heart attacks before. Shastri was short in physical stature but stood up to the much larger size of Ayub. At the airport, after a gentle gesture from Kosygin, Ayub assisted Kosygin in lifting Shastri’s coffin on to the aeroplane going back to India.
There were angry student protests against the Tashkent declaration. Pakistan information ministry had earlier misled the people that Pakistan had won the war.

British response to the Indian attack on Lahore had caused the British to be viewed by India as a ‘Semi-Hostile Nation’. India was disappointed by lack of international support and even the USSR did not condemn Pakistan infiltration of August 1965. China threat on 16th Sept to India had led to both USSR and USA warnings to China but Britain had remained muted.
Ayub Khan took the gamble that Grandslam and Gibraltar won’t trigger all out war with India. He also misjudged Indian Army and Shastri. Both countries refrained from bombing civilian targets and both countries observed Geneva Convention.

US thinking
Robert Komer, the National Security Adviser to Lyndon Johnson, wrote in his account that when Johnson became President of US after the assassination of JFK, he asked to explain JFK’s pro India stance. He said he liked Ayub and Indians were the worst people to deal with he had ever seen. Komer replied  that Pakistan are Aryans and their forefathers were Aryan invaders of India, Hindu philosophy is very antithetical to our way of thinking and Mohammedism is much closer to western thought but India has 6 times more people than Pakistan and can act as counterweight to communist China. 

Its a great book and offers almost a neutral assessment of the war though the tinge of pro-Pakistan bias exists throughout the book.
Highly Recommended (9/10)

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