Book Review [132] : From Kutch to Tashkent

I have read few books on 1971 war but none on 1965. India and Pakistan both claim that they won it but the truth lies closer to Indian claim. India had in its possession more territory than Pakistan and Tashkent declaration was more favorable to India than Pakistan. This is also claimed by many neutral writers and even by somewhat pro-Pakistan writer Farooq Bajwa in his book 'From Kutch to Tashkent'.

The Genesis

General Ayub Khan became the President of Pakistan in 1958 after a military coup. He declared martial law in the country. Bhutto became the foreign minister of Pakistan in 1962, he was only 34. Ayub Khan introduced a new constitution of ‘indirect democracy’ in 1962. There was no provision of universal adult franchise.  There were 80,000 strong electorates handpicked by the regime. Fatima Jinnah, the sister of Muhammad Ali Jinnah, gave a tough fight to Ayub Khan in January 1965 Presidential elections. She secured 38, 691 votes out of 80,000 votes. Ayub Khan had to rig the elections to win Presidency. In order to secure popular support which he lost in the Presidential elections as people thronged in large numbers in Fatima Jinnah’s rallies, Ayub Khan triggered 1965 war. He also thought that India was weakened by the 1962 war, Shastri was not a great leader, Hindus have no stomach for fight, India was facing famine and economic crisis and China would support Pakistan and perhaps Pakistan would not get a better chance to shame India than in 1965.

  

USSR turned slightly warm towards Pakistan between 1962 and 1965. USSR refrained from any criticism of Pakistan in late 1962 in UNSC when Kashmir was being debated. US under Lyndon Johnson (Nov 1963 onwards) was not happy with Pakistan getting cozy with China and Lyndon Johnson warned Foreign Minister Bhutto in Nov 1963. Pakistan was also not happy with US giving military aid to India during and after 1962 war. Pakistan made a major shift in its foreign policy in April 1965 by making friendly gestures to China and USSR. Ayub Khan visited China in March 1965 and USSR in April 1965. He made an astonishing offer to USSR that if USSR agreed to stop Vetoing in UNSC favouring Indian position then Pakistan would ask US to dismantle its bases from Pakistan territory.  This softened the anti-Pakistan stance of USSR. But US did not like it and it cancelled the proposed visit of Ayub Khan to US in late April 1965. The US-Pakistan relations stretched to the maximum extent by then.

Fighting in Kutch

In January 1965 tension escalated between India and Pakistan over Kanjarkot fort (an abandoned fort in Rann of Kutch) when Indian Special Reserve Police found new track formed by heavy vehicles in the region that was south of the border as claimed by India. Pakistan claimed it as its own. Both sides started aggressive patrolling and a minor border skirmish broke out in April 1965. In May British PM Harold Wilson offered to negotiate. The ceasefire commenced on 1^st July 1965 and both sides agreed to retreat to 1^st Jan 1965 position. The dispute was referred to a 3 member arbitration panel whose members were nominated by India and Pakistan (one member each) and the third member was by UN Secretary General. It gave its award in 1968 and was a great victory for Pakistan as they defeated Indian forces in quick succession in Kutch region. Ayub Khan said that “Hindu has no stomach for a fight” and this belief became a cornerstone of all further Pakistan military decisions. US also objected to Pakistan use of US weapons against India as these weapons were not supposed to be used against any country in offensive operations. Pakistan also thought that the qualitative edge that it enjoyed against India in terms of weapons etc would even out once Indian modernization of military completes by late 1960s so 1965 was the best time to humiliate India militarily.

Operation Gibraltar

It was a daring plan to send thousands of Pakistani soldiers and paramilitaries from Azad Kashmir into Indian Kashmir disguised as Kashmiri guerillas, to engage Indian forces in Indian Kashmir as well as leading a popular civilian revolt against Indian rule. It was the first part followed by Operation Grand Slam. Both plans were prepared by General Akhtar Malik.

The Gibraltar forces were divided into six groups – Babur, Ghazanavi, Salahuddin, Khalid, Qasim and Tariq. The total strength was about 5 to 7 thousand troops. All the Gibraltar troops were to operate in civilian dress. Bhutto was the key person behind this idea.On 5^th August a large number of Pakistan forces infiltrated in India but were detected by India. India objected to U Thant Secretary General of UN about it and even the chief of UN Military Observer Group on India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) confirmed Indian position to the Secretary General. On 8^th August Voice of Kashmir radio station run from inside Kashmir declared the formation of the Revolutionary Council of Kashmir and called for the liberation war. But the majority of Kashmiris did not support the infiltrators.  India captured some Gibraltar force members and they disclosed the entire plan of Pakistan on All India Radio. Thus the operation ended in a great disaster.

India captured 3 Pakistani posts north of Kargil on 16^th August.  India attacked three Pakistan posts across the LOC in the Tithwal region (Uri-Poonch bulge) on 21^st August. India captured Haji Pir Pass on 28^th August. It was a strategic pass through which most of the provisions had to pass for Pakistan forces in the valley. The Gibraltar forces were now isolated in Kashmir.

Operation Grand Slam

It was the code name given to the plan for an armored thrust by 12 Division against Indian forces across the ‘cease fire line’ at Akhnur was a critical supply line for Indian forces from India to Srinagar. Ayub Khan gave green light to Operation Grand Slam on 29^th August; time was running out for Pakistan as Gibraltar forces were getting decimated by India so it was important to execute Grand Slam as soon as possible.  It was launched on 1^st Sept 0330 hrs. It was supported by massive artillery. It was launched in the Chhamb sector. India was caught by surprise. Indians withdrew to prevent Pakistan from crossing the Tawi River. By noon Pakistan had surrounded the Chhamb sector.

India launched airstrikes at 1700 hrs to relieve pressure and by sunset India has destroyed 13 Pakistan tanks and many armored vehicles and lost two Indian vampires. Pakistan has Paton tanks. India had centurions but they could not be sent because they were heavy and Akhnur bridge could not hold that weight.

UNMOGIP had warned India about Pakistan build up in Chhamb sector but India did not pay any attention. China declared support for Pakistan action on 4^th Sept 1965. The Foreign Minister of China visited Pakistan on 4^th Sept. UNSC asked Pakistan and India to order ceasefire and return to cease fire line as existed before but both countries refused. On 2^nd Sept Chhamb was taken. Pakistan had captured all area west of Tawi river. Indians retreated to defend Akhnoor and abandoned Chhamb.

On 2^nd Sept General Musa asked Major General Yahya Khan to take command of Operation Grandslam from Major General Akhtar Malik. No concrete reasons given or may be because Gibraltar and Grandslam did not produce the expected results. This changed the course of the war. Akhtar Malik was awarded Pakistan’s second highest gallantry award. He was Ahmadiya.

Ayub Khan was concerned with India fighting as all out war. His main aim was to highlight Kashmir issue and pressurize India to hold plebiscite on it.  He asked his men to consolidate the gains of Grandslam. On 5^th Sept Jaurian town was taken by Pakistan. Pakistan was within 4 miles of Akhnur. India crossed the Punjab border on 6^th Sept to relieve the pressure on Akhnur. Pakistan reluctance to capture Akhnur gave India a much needed space. Pakistan was supposed to capture Akhnur by 2^nd Sept but they did not do it even by 5^th Sept.

India had Centurion and Sherman tanks about 1400 in number while Pakistan had 900 tanks including 360 Paton tanks. Paton tanks had 90 mm gun, range of 1800 yards and equipped with infra red gun sight so that it can fight in night as well. While Indian tanks had 84 mm gun, range of 1200 yards and can not fight in night. Indian Air Force had an advantage of 210 Planes to 97 of Pakistan.

Operation Riddle

Indian Army Chief was General J N Choudhury and Lt. General Harbaksh Singh was GOC Western Command. Operation Riddle was the codename of the plan finalized by Lt. General Harbaksh Singh to assault Lahore. Lt. General Joginder Singh Dhillon was to lead the assault on Lahore. It was to be a three prong attack.  15^th Infantry Division led by Major General N. Prasad was to advance along the Amritsar-Lahore route, 7^th Infantry Division led by Major General S K Sibal was to move on the Harike-Khalra-Barki road and 4 Mountain Division led by Major General Gurbaksh Singh to enter along Khem Karan – Kasur route.

Operation began on 0330 hrs on 6^th Sept. Pakistan was taken by complete surprise but 3 Baluch and PAF slowed down the advance of 15^th Infantry Division under Prasad. General Prasad was sacked from his command as he failed to take advantage of the surprise element. Pakistan counter offensive caused heavy damage to Indians on 7^th Sept. Pakistan commanders showed exemplary leadership compared to Indians. The attack by 15^th Infantry Division was foiled in this region.

7 Infantry Division led by Major General S K Sibal crossed border on 6^th Sept and captured Barki village amidst great fighting on 10^th Sept. Major Aziz Bhatii of Pakistan was awarded highest gallantry award posthumously. 7 Infantry Division could not make any further gain.

Khem Karan – Kasur road was southernmost route of India’s three pronged assault on Lahore. Kasur (6 miles deep in Pakistan) and Khem Karan (1 mile in India) are crucial points. 4 Mountain Division failed in its objective and proved to be the weakest link. It retreated to Indian border on 8^th Sept after suffering heavy causalities losing almost half of its fighting capability.

Operation Riddle achieved its objective of halting Pakistan’s capture of Akhnur but failed in capturing Lahore. Indian Artillery proved to be highly ineffective compared to Pakistan’s. Pakistan launched counter offensive Operation Mailed Fist.

Operation Mailed Fist

It was launched in Khem Karan front as it was the weakest link of India. 4 Mountain Division had already suffered heavy losses in this front. It was to be led by famous 1 Armored Division. 4 Mountain Division’s morale was very low and was suffering from desertions.  Operation Mailed Fist had to be a kind of Blitzkrieg. The Operation started at 0430 hrs on 8^th Sept. by 1100 hrs Pakistan had captured Khem Karan. The town was abandoned by Indian forces. Pakistan division penetrated 8 miles deep but retreated back to Khem Karan for refueling and also it did not have infantry support. This was a major blunder as India got 1 crucial day to prepare the defenses.  Indian 2^nd Independent Armored Brigade reached the border on 9^th Sept at 0400 hrs. It was placed under the command of 4 Mountain Division. Operation Mailed Fist resumed on 9^th Morning but now the 18 Rajputana Rifles gave a tough fight as Asal Uttar and Pakistan 6 Lancers had to retreat.

Pakistan made the third and final push on 10^th Sept morning.  India used the sugarcane field to hide her tanks and breached the Rohi Nala. The Paton tanks were bogged down in the marsh and about 70 Pakistan tanks were destroyed by India 6 mm recoilless guns mounted on Jeeps. Grenadier Havildar Abdul Hamid was awarded PVC for destroying 3 Pakistan tanks by his 6 mm recoilless gun. Pakistan did not know that Asal Uttar was head quarter of 4 Mountain Division. 4 Mountain Division saved India and by 11^th Sept Operation Mailed Fist decisively failed.

UN asked for ceasefire on 6^th Sept, both sides refused. US applied total embargo on military aid and sales to India and Pakistan on 8^th Sept. Britain was harsher on India. It stopped all military aid to India wef 6^th Sept. Britain said CENTO did not apply within commonwealth. US did not help Pakistan and Pakistan took it as a great betrayal. Pakistan had just 3 to 4 weeks of fighting capability. China was not even a member of UN and Taiwan was occupying China seat in UNSC (till 25^th Oct 1971). Any direct assistance from China would have irrevocably ruptured US-Pakistan relations. China declared on 7^th Sept that Indian attack was a naked aggression. China gave assurance to Pakistan that if India attacked East Pakistan then China would attack India in Bengal and northern border. Chinese forces were put on high alert on Sikkim border and China gave an ultimatum to India. Indonesia, Iran and Turkey also supported Pakistan. Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Iraq gave diplomatic support to Pakistan. Ethiopia and Yugoslavia had supported India

Operation Nepal

This was the operation of assaulting Sialkot. 1 Armored Division was India’s main armored strike force. It was led by Major General Rajinder Singh ‘Sparrow’.  Operation objective was to draw into battle and destroy Pakistan armour. Operation commenced at 2300 hrs on 7^th Sept.

Indian Army reached within 5 miles of Sialkot on 8^th Sept. Brigadier Ismail, GOC 15 Division was relieved of his command at 0660 hrs because of poor defense and replaced by Major General Tikka Khan. The famous Indian 1 Armored Division was not able to make any progress because of downpour or assault by PAF and the communication broke down between Infantry and Armour. Indians halted their assault to see the result of the great battle of Asal Uttar.

India decisively won the battle on 10^th Sept and on 11^th Sept 1 Armored Division of India advanced on two fronts, Charwa-Chawinda and Kaloi-Pogowal towards Phillora town. Despite fierce Pakistani resistance Indians managed to capture the town at 1530 hrs on 11 Sept. India’s 14 Infantry Division failed to capture Zafarwal but it captured Bhagowal town by 0600 hrs on 13^th Sept.

1 Armored Division fought fierce battle with Pakistan forces involving armour, artillery and infantry between 1200 and 1800 hrs on 14^th Sept but failed to conquer Chawinda town. PAF played a crucial role in defense of Chawinda town. 6 Armored Division was defending Chawinda town. The Battle of Chawinda is considered biggest tank battle after WW 1 and resulted in Indian defeat. India’s formidable 1 Armored Division failed to make any impact beyond Chawinda just like Pakistan’s 1 Armored Division in case of Asal Uttar. India lost close to 100 tanks while Pakistan about 70. India still held much of Pakistan territory in Sialkot region even after its failure to capture Chawinda town.

Eastern Front

No action of this front. Eastern command was under General Sam Manekshaw.  Pakistan had 1 division while India had 11 divisions. So Pakistan did not take any chance. There were occasional air raids in this sector.

Air and Naval War

On the night of 7/8 Sept two Pakistani destroyers bombarded the Indian post of Dwarka, the town sacred to Hindus. Indian Navy was caught napping.  India did not retaliate.

Pakistan had 17 Squadrons including the most advanced F-104 Starfighter (12 in number) which can fly at Mach 2 (twice the speed of sound). It was supplied to Pakistan by US in 1961 despite of Indian objections. In numbers India had a decisive superiority.

PAF raided IAF bases on 6^th Sept at Pathankot, Adampur and Halwara from Sargodha and Peshawar bases and destroyed many Indian aircraft on ground. The objective was to destroy as many Indian planes as possible to minimize Indian numerical superiority.  IAF retaliated but Pakistan was well prepared and India suffered losses.

Pressure for Cease fire

Pakistan situation was very desperate because of poor industrial base and US arms embargo. China on 16^th Sept gave ultimatum of three days until 19^th sept to India to dismantle the border installations on Indo-China border, stop the intrusions and undertake not to carry out any more raids across the border. Shastri offered a joint Indo-China commission to examine the truth of the accusations. Because of Chinese pro-Pakistan stance USSR continued supply of weapons to India during the war.

Turkey had given military assistance to Pakistan which included F-86 fighter jets, anti-tank guided missiles, mortar shells, ammunitions etc.

Bhutto was not keen on ceasefire and wanted Indian forces out of Kashmir as a pre condition for a ceasefire while Ayub Khan did not want to antagonize US. It was Bhutto who was behind the war though Ayub Khan cannot hide behind this excuse. Ayub Khan wanted a face saving device in form of a UNSC resolution on Kashmir issue.

Ayub Khan flew to China in complete secrecy on 20^th Sept and met Zhou En Lai. Zhou advised him to prepare for a long drawn war against India and promised Chinese support. Pakistan was not prepared for a long drawn war. China was ready to support Pakistan on whatever decision Pakistan was going to take.

UNSC passed a resolution 211 on Kashmir under Article 40 on 20^th Sept. It demanded that ceasefire should take effect on 22^nd Sept 1965 at 0700 hrs GMT. Both countries should withdraw their personnel to the positions held by them before 5^th August 1965. UNSC also said that it is convinced that ceasefire is essential as first step towards a peaceful settlement of outstanding differences between two countries over Kashmir. There were no assurances of any binding arbitration over Kashmir.

India was ready to accept resolution as it was wary of Chinese ultimatum. Ayub blamed India for exaggerating Chinese threat. India accepted the UNSC Resolution on 22^nd Sept. Bhutto travelled to UN on 21^st Sept. After the Indian acceptance of UNSC Resolution, Ayub Khan directed Bhutto to do the same. Bhutto made an emotional speech on 22^nd Sept in UN and agreed to UNSC Resolution. He also threatened to leave UN if UN failed to resolve the issue this time, this threat was quickly and firmly denied by Pakistan. Ayub Khan addressed the nation on TV. Millions of people heard him with surprise and anger, many in the Armed forces wept as he spoke. The war was effectively over by 23^rd Sept. Pakistan was not in a position to win the war and for India it would have been a very expensive victory.

Firing had stopped but both the countries remained with the occupation of the captured territory. USSR offered to host a summit between India and Pakistan at Tashkent after the ceasefire. It was accepted by India on 22^nd Sept but resisted by Pakistan.

As per US evaluation India won the war but her performance was not upto the mark. India lost 300 tanks while Pakistan 250. India had gained more territory and suffered less proportionate losses.

Britain and US probed India to give some concessions to Pakistan over Kashmir but Shastri confidently refused. India was now seen as more confident and proud of its ability to stand up to China and Pakistan at the same time.

Pakistan accepted to participate in the Tashkent summit on 8^th Dec. Ayub Khan went to address UN in Dec (13^th) and met US president on 14^th and 15^th Dec. Ayub Khan in his address in UN GA criticized India’s position on Kashmir which caused Indian walkout. In his meeting with Ayub Khan, US President Johnson warned Ayub Khan that Bhutto was a dangerous man. US also clarified that It was not in any position to pressurize India on Kashmir and it was better for Pakistan to attend Tashkent summit with open mind. US did not give any assurance to Pakistan. US special relationship with Pakistan was over for a while. Pakistan senior ministers blamed Bhutto for the entire mess and cooling of relations with US. Ayub Khan had said that Pakistan cannot be sacrificed for the sake of Kashmir and Bhutto was blamed for risking Pakistan for Kashmir.

Tashkent Summit

Indian and Pakistan delegations arrived at Tashkent on 3^rd Dec. USSR PM Alexei Kosygin personally hosted the summit.  India’s main conditions were that Pakistan should accept the Cease fire line as the international border in Kashmir, a no-war pact and Pakistan should not repeat Gibraltar kind of adventure. India also was not ready for any concession on Kashmir. Pakistan wanted resolution of Kashmir dispute either by agreement or plebiscite.  Ayub Khan told Kosygin that he would not shake hands with Shastri the next day as the photo would have a negative effect in Pakistan. Kosygin reacted with anger to this and said that Shastri deserved respect as head of state. Ayub Khan backed down.

Ayub Khan, Shastri and Kosygin made speeches on 4^th January. Shastri speech was received with applause by all present except Bhutto who had to be nudged by Ayub Khan to join in. UNSC Resolution 211 had called for the ceasefire and withdrawal of forces to 5^th August state. This would mean that India had to give up Hazi Pir Pass and other areas. Indian PM Shastri discussed this with Foreign Minister Swaran Singh and Defence Minister Y B Chavan who were with him for the talks. They agreed to give up these territories for peace sake. On 5^th January India gave first concession. It agreed to give up gains in Kashmir. Soviet found Ayub as decent while Bhutto as obstructive. Ayub Khan pleaded Shastri in Urdu on 7^th Jan “Kashmir ke mamle main kuch aisa kar dijiye ki main apne mulk main munh dikhane ke kabil rahoon”. Shastri replied “Sadar Sahib, Main bahut maafi chahta hoon ki main is mamle main apki koi khidmat nahin kar sakta”.

China threatened India on 8^th Jan that it would strike back resolutely against aggressive Indian behavior on border. On 9^th Kosygin tried to persuade Shastri to make some more concession on Kashmir. Shastri said that he would rather resign and give up politics then compromise Indian position. Kosygin backtracked.

Tashkent declaration was signed on 10^th Jan 1966. The main points were:

•          ·            India and Pakistan would settle their disputes through peaceful means.
•          ·            Armed forces would withdraw to 5 August position by 24^th Feb 1966.

Declaration was a major diplomatic triumph for India. Kashmir issue was not discussed. Bhutto refused to applaud the signing ceremony.  On 10^th/11^th night after the banquet Shastri died of heart attack in his sleep. He had survived two heart attacks before. Shastri was short in physical stature but stood up to the much larger size of Ayub. At the airport, after a gentle gesture from Kosygin, Ayub assisted Kosygin in lifting Shastri’s coffin on to the aeroplane going back to India.

There were angry student protests against the Tashkent declaration. Pakistan information ministry had earlier misled the people that Pakistan had won the war.

British response to the Indian attack on Lahore had caused the British to be viewed by India as a ‘Semi-Hostile Nation’. India was disappointed by lack of international support and even the USSR did not condemn Pakistan infiltration of August 1965. China threat on 16^th Sept to India had led to both USSR and USA warnings to China but Britain had remained muted.

Ayub Khan took the gamble that Grandslam and Gibraltar won’t trigger all out war with India. He also misjudged Indian Army and Shastri. Both countries refrained from bombing civilian targets and both countries observed Geneva Convention.

US thinking

Robert Komer, the National Security Adviser to Lyndon Johnson, wrote in his account that when Johnson became President of US after the assassination of JFK, he asked to explain JFK’s pro India stance. He said he liked Ayub and Indians were the worst people to deal with he had ever seen. Komer replied  that Pakistan are Aryans and their forefathers were Aryan invaders of India, Hindu philosophy is very antithetical to our way of thinking and Mohammedism is much closer to western thought but India has 6 times more people than Pakistan and can act as counterweight to communist China. 

Its a great book and offers almost a neutral assessment of the war though the tinge of pro-Pakistan bias exists throughout the book.

Highly Recommended (9/10)

Book Review [131] : Somanatha - The Many Voices Of History

Every civilization has a love that warms its heart; India has many such hearts and Somnath is one of them. 

Mahmud of Ghazni raided Somnath, desecrated the holy temple, broke the Shiva lingam into pieces and carried those pieces to Ghazni and installed those below the footsteps of the Mosque of Ghazni to be trampled by feet of the people going to/coming from Mosque (according to Al Beruni, who was contemporary of Mahmud of Ghazni and an eye witness of the destruction). This happened in 1024. Al Beruni also writes that the raids of Mahmud caused such devastation that the Hindus came to dislike the Muslims permanently.  

'Somanatha - The Many Voices of History' by Romila Thapar is a very good attempt to whitewash the barbaric invasions of Mahmud of Ghazni and to rationalize it.

Farrukhi Sistani was the court poet of Mahmud of Ghazni. He writes that Mahmud destroyed the temple by setting it on fire. According to him the word Somanatha was a garbled version of su-manat – referring to the goddess Manat of Arabia. She was originally worshiped as Semitic Goddess Ishtar and was one of the important trio of Goddesses – Lat, Uzza and Manat, mentioned in a verse of Quran. These were the goddesses of the three shrines close to Mecca and were considered daughters of God. They each were represented by natural stones. The pilgrimage to Kaba was considered incomplete without a visit to the shrine of Manat.  Prophet Muhammad had called for the destruction of these shrines. Ali destroyed the shrine of Manat on instruction from Muhammad but some sources say that it was saved.

These Goddesses were involved in what is called satanic verses; Initially Muhammad said that these Goddesses can be worshiped as intermediaries of God. Later Muhammad declared that these verses were inspired by Satan and these were expunged from Quran. Gardizi was another contemporary historian. According to Gardizi and Sistani the images of the two goddesses were destroyed while Manat was saved and taken over to Kathiawar for safekeeping in a land where idol worship was considered normal.

According to Romila Thapar there might be many reasons behind Mahmud expedition to Somnath:

•         He wanted to destroy Hindu temple
•         He wanted to destroy the temple of Manat (i.e. the Somnatha Temple)
•         He wanted to stop the horse trade between Arabia and Veraval so that he  could benefit from the horse trade through his territory.

During the time of Mahmud of Ghazni, Multan was ruled by Ismaili ruler. Mahmud sacked Multan and put Ismailis to death. The Ismailis were considered heretics by the Sunni Muslims. These Ismailis had earlier destroyed the Multan temple and constructed their Mosque in 10th century. Mahmud in his letters to Caliph of Baghdad mentioned in great details the richness of Somnath. Barani, Isami and Minhaj Siraj also mention that Idol was of Manat at Somnatha.  Badayuni wrote that Somnatha was not Manat. He says that the part of broken idol was sent to be placed at the entrance of Ghazni mosque (Al Beruni also mentions the same).

Ulugh Khan destroyed the temple and built the mosque at its place in 1299 and sent the Idol to the Alauddin Khilji, the Idol was taken around the city to entertain the people. Mujaffar Khan (Governor of Gujarat) destroyed temple in 1395 and built a mosque over it. Zafar Khan did the same in 1398 and Mahmud Beghada in 1469. Akbar permitted the worship of Shivlinga at Somnath and appointed officers to administer it. Aurangzeb ordered its destruction in 1706. Ahalyabai Holkar built a small temple in its vicinity. Turkish and Persian texts mention destruction of Somnath temple in great details but did not give so much importance to other destroyed temples while Indian texts are almost silent on this gory event.

A Kadamba King ruling Goa region records his pilgrimage to Somnath in an inscription in 1038. He did not mention anything about destruction or desecration. There is no mention of the attack of Mahmud on Somnath temple in any Indian text. An inscription dated 1264 in Sanskrit and Arabic mentions grant of land to a Muslim trader from Hormuz, named Nuruddin Firuz, to build a mosque in the vicinity of Somnath temple. The Arabic text of the inscription has a sentence expressing the desirability of Somnatha Pattana becoming a city of Islam with no infidels and no idols, a wish that is tactfully omitted in the Sanskrit version. There is one inscription of 1406 in Veraval in Sanskrit. It begins with the Muslim greetings “Bismillah –e- Rahman –e- Rahim”. It gives details of a Bohra named Farid who died defending the Somnath town against the invading Turks.

The poet Dhanapala, the poet in the court of Bhoja Paramara, contemporary of Mahmud of Ghazni mentioned that Mahmud looted a lot of towns en-route to Somnath and broke the idol of Somnath. He also mentioned that Mahmud failed to break the idol of Mahavira at Satyapura in south Rajasthan. The Idol was too strong and may be the writer was trying to prove the superiority of Mahavira Idol over others. Kashmiri poet Bilhana visited the place fifty years after the event but he does not mention the Mahmud desecration. Kalhana though mentions the expedition of Mahmud against Shahis, does not mention the expedition of Mahmud to Somnath.

Some verses in the ‘Shabara Tantra’ refer to Mahmud of Ghazni. These verses praise Mahmud of Ghazni. These were recited by the Tantrics/Nathapanthis/Shaktas etc. Some verses of these sects venerate Allah and Muslim pirs.

Alexander Burnes deputed to the court of Maharaja Ranjit Singh mentions that Maharaja was negotiating with Shuja and his offer of help to Shuja was contingent on Shuja’s returning gates of Somnatha temple from Ghazni. This was in 1831. Before this period there is no mention of any such gates taken by Mahmud to Ghazni. Though locals of Ghazni thought the gates had come from some sacred place (i.e. Somnath Temple). The custodians of the Mahmud’s tomb pleaded with General Nott to leave the gates behind but General Nott refused (as instructed by the Governor General of India Lord Ellenborough), it was in 1842 and happened during first Anglo-Afghan war. Ferishta mentions the raid of Mahmud on Somnath but he did not mention anything about gates. Lord Ellenborough was fiercely attacked in the House of Commons by other MPs including Lord Macaulay for promoting ‘superstitious’ Hindu religion and antagonizing Muslims. Lord Ellenborough said that the insult that was heaped on India by Mahmud of Ghazni 800 years back had to be avenged and the painful feelings that were rankling in the hearts of the Hindus needed to be removed. Lord Ellenborough won the debate in the Parliament. 

The Somnatha Temple site was excavated in 1950s and some evidence of burning and desecration of sculpture have been found. The new temple was built in 1951 and inaugurated by the first President of India. K M Munshi played a great role in it.

In my humble opinion this temple is a symbol of the victory of faith over the dark powers of destruction.
Recommended (7/10)

Book Review [130] : Kishtwar Cauldron - The Struggle Against ISI's Ethnic Cleansing

When Pakistan sponsored terrorists planned to ethnically cleanse Doda-Kishtwar region by massacring minority community (mainly Dogras) in large numbers in late 90s and early 2000s, basically It was a plan to replicate the-successful-ethnic-cleansing-of-Kashmiri-Pundits from valley model of 1990-91 in Doda-Kisthwar region, the Indian Army and the people gave Pakistan a fitting reply by exterminating the terrorists.

'Kishtwar Cauldron' by Major General (retd) G D Baskshi is very fine record of his tenure in Doda-Kishtwar region and it helps in great details to understand the designs of Paksitan.

The story that the electoral malpractices of the 1988 elections in J&K were the root cause of the insurgency is a kind of a cruel joke. Pakistan cleverly planned its master plan of Kashmir much earlier. It was the plan of President Zia ul Haq to use Afghanistan Mujahideen kind of extremists in Kashmir. As Pakistan was helping/assisting US so it thought US would not opposed it.

ISI sent few thousands agents/trained people to provide an extreme interpretation of Islam and to twist it for Pakistan’s political advantage. The JKLF started as Pakistan sponsored organization but ISI did not like its pro-Independence stance and ISI helped Hizbul Mujahideen to wipe out JKLF by 1995. Indian forces made full use of this fratricidal struggle.  Indian Army checked the rise of terrorism and infiltration and elections were conducted in 1996 (both Assembly and Parliamentary). The fencing on LOC started in 2003 and completed by 2005. This drastically reduced the infiltration. 

The story of Doda-Kishtwar region is bit different. Doda before its division used to be a huge district with more than 11,000 sq kms. Now it has an area of 2300 sq km and Kishtwar district has about 7800 sq km. It has rugged and snow peaked mountains. In south it touches HP, in east it touches Kargil district and in west it is bounded by Pir Panjal range. Kashmiri terrorists first came to Doda in 1991 to escape the pressure of Indian Army. Doda region did not have any army presence that time. Soon ISI realized the importance of this region. Terrorists started using its high pastures as safe haven and often found shelters with Gujjar and Bakarwal communities.  In 1993 the terrorists carried out the massacre of 14 Hindus in a bus near Hasti near Kishtwar. By 1994 the civilian administration was fully paralyzed and terrorism reached its peak in Doda. 800 Dogra families migrated to HP. Rashtriya Rifles and CRPF were allocated to his region. To prevent mass migration of the Dogra minority, the Village Defence Committee (VDC) was revived and some 330 villages were brought under the protection of VDCs by issuing weapons (mainly archaic but sturdy 303 rifle) to local Hindu youths and the ex servicemen of these villages. The massacres of Dogras resumed after some lull in 1995 and 1996. In July 1998 about 64 Dogras were massacred at three places. There was a kind of cat and mouse game between government and terrorists and Dogras were caught in between. The massacres continued unabated and about 50 Dogras were killed in 2000. From 1993-2001 a total of 229 Dogras were systematically massacred in this region in order to cause ethnic cleansing of this region. The Human Rights body did not utter a single word on this brutal attempt of ethnic cleansing.

Major General (retd) G D Bakshi was appointed sector commander of this region in Oct 2000. He immediately brought situation under control. The tide turned in 2001. 13 Hindus (Dogras) including women and children were mercilessly killed by the terrorists in August 2001 in Kishtwar. General Bakshi took it very seriously and used all the forces under his disposal to track down the terrorists and by September 2001 all the terrorists involved in this massacre were extirpated. There was no massacre of minorities after Sept 2001 in this region.

Its a very good book to understand the brutal designs of Pakistan and home grown terrorists and their sympathizers from this state. Its a common saying that if you can see your enemy you can kill it but if you cant understand your enemy then you cant defeat it.

Highly Recommended (8/10)